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This appeal is from (i) an Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment for Plaintiff dated 
December 9, 1994 ("First Summary Judgment Order"), (ii) an Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated October 26, 1995 ("Second Summary Judgment Order"), and (iii) 
a Judgment of Specific Performance dated December 14, 1995 ("Specific Performance 
Judgment").1 The Specific Performance Judgment was, by stipulation of all parties and order 
of court, certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court 
is vested with jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
n. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The single issue presented for review in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in 
granting the motion of appellee Robert J. Walter ("Buyer") for summary judgment that the 
parties reached an enforceable contract to sell and purchase a parcel of real property in the face 
of substantial direct and inferential evidence that appellants (collectively, "Sellers") revoked their 
offer to sell the property before the Buyer completed his attempted acceptance of the offer. 
1
 A copy of the First Summary Judgment Order, the Second Summary Judgment Order, and the Specific 
Performance Judgment is attached to this brief as Addenda A, B, and C, respectively. The First Summary 
Judgment Order was entered by the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, and the Second Summary Judgment Order and 
the Specific Performance Judgment were entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Summit County. 
1 
This issue2 is a question of law to which this Court will not defer to the trial court but 
will review the trial court's determinations for correctness. Pratt by and Through Pratt v. 
Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co.. 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); Scharfv. BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Inasmuch as this appeal is taken from the entry of summary judgment 
against the Sellers, this Court must review the facts and inferences in the light most favorable 
to the Sellers. Pratt, 813 P.2d at 1171; Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 
1991). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules whose interpretation 
is believed to be solely determinative of the issues on appeal. However, one of the grounds on 
which the trial court found that the Buyer's acceptance preceded the Sellers' revocation was that 
the Buyer's agent was in an independent contractor relationship with her brokerage company. 
According to the trial court, this relationship precluded the Buyer's agent from being imputed 
with the Sellers' notice to her brokerage company of the Sellers' decision to revoke. Rule 
6.2.9.2 of the Rules of the Utah Division of Real Estate is, therefore, directly relevant to this 
appeal. That Rule, a copy of which is attached as Addenda D, states that ,![t]he existence of an 
independent contractor relationship or any other special compensation arrangement between the 
2
 This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 25-35, 53-65, 161-71, 295-308, and 527-57. 
2 
broker and affiliated licensees shall not release the broker and licensees of any duties, 
obligations, or responsibilities." 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The Buyer commenced this case to enforce a contract that he allegedly reached with the 
Sellers for the purchase and sale of a valuable parcel of unimproved real property ("Property") 
in Deer Valley, Utah. (R. 12-22). The Buyer's principal claim was for a decree of specific 
performance compelling the Sellers to convey title to the Property upon payment of $967,350. 
(R. 12-15, 745-50). 
The Sellers counterclaimed against the Buyer for a declaratory judgment that because the 
Sellers revoked their offer to sell the Property before the Buyer accepted, the parties never 
reached an enforceable agreement to sell or purchase the Property. (R. 25-31). The Sellers 
subsequently impleaded their real estate agents, alleging that if the court concluded that the 
Sellers and Buyer actually reached an enforceable agreement to transfer the Property, the Sellers' 
agents had breached their obligations to timely and effectively revoke the Sellers' offer before 
the Buyer accepted the offer. (R. 237-46). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court. 
Several months after the Buyer filed his complaint, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment on the issue of whether the Buyer's attempted acceptance of the Sellers' offer 
3 
to sell the Property preceded or followed the Sellers' revocation of the offer. (R. 53-65, 79-122, 
161-99). In its First Summary Judgment Order, the court concluded that because the Buyer's 
agent was an "independent contractor" and not an "employee" of the brokerage company with 
whom she was affiliated " . . . she was not imputed with any knowledge that [the brokerage 
company] or [the Sellers' agent] may have had relating to [the Sellers'] attempt to revoke their 
counteroffer." (R. 369). The court further concluded in the First Summary Judgment Order 
that the Buyer's agent had no knowledge of the Sellers' revocation of their offer " . . . until after 
she had communicated [the Buyer's] acceptance of the offer to [the Sellers'] agent." (Id.) 
Shortly thereafter, the court denied the Buyer's motion for summary judgment "on the 
disputed issue as to whether [the Sellers'] revocation of the counter-offer preceded or followed 
[the Buyer's] acceptance of said counter-offer," holding that" . . . there remain factual disputes" 
which, if resolved through further discovery, could be adjudicated through a renewed motion 
for summary judgment. (R. 361). 
After additional discovery was conducted, the Buyer filed a renewed motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that there was no factual dispute that the Buyer accepted the Sellers' offer 
before the Sellers revoked it. (R. 484-526). In granting the Buyer's motion, the court 
concluded in the Second Summary Judgment Order that "[the Sellers] had failed to present 
sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the Buyer] was 
notified of [the Sellers'] attempt to revoke their counteroffer prior to his acceptance;" that "[t]he 
record demonstrates that [the Buyer] was not informed of [the Sellers'] attempt to revoke their 
4 
counteroffer until after his acceptance was communicated to [the Sellers'] real estate agent;" and 
that "[the Sellers'] arguments regarding the subject matter of any communications between the 
parties' real estate agents that allegedly occurred before [the Buyer] accepted the counteroffer 
are mere speculation and do not create a genuine issue of material fact upon which reasonable 
minds could differ." (R. 738-39). 
On December 15, 1995, the court entered the Specific Performance Judgment which 
directed the Sellers to convey the Property to the Buyer upon payment of the sum of $967,350. 
(R. 746-49). Several days later, the Sellers filed their notice of appeal. (R. 751-52). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In December 1993, the Sellers signed a listing contract with Bald Eagle Realty 
("Brokerage Company") for the purpose of selling the Property. (R. 129-31). The listing 
contract designated both the Brokerage Company and its principal broker, Jonathan Olch 
("Mr. Olch"), as the Sellers' agents. (Listing Contract, 1 6; R. 129). Janet Olch 
("Mrs. Olch"), an affiliate of the Brokerage Company and the wife of Mr. Olch, served as the 
Buyer's agent. (R. 123-24). Mr. and Mrs. Olch's assistant at the Brokerage Company was Kate 
Doordan ("Doordan").3 (R. 559, 576). The scope of Doordan's duties for Mrs. Olch was 
broad: Mrs. Olch had given Doordan authority to sign checks on her behalf; to assist her in 
transmitting offers, counteroffers, acceptances and other communications between transacting 
3
 Mr. Olch, as the principal broker and sole shareholder of the Brokerage Company, testified in his deposition 
that Doordan's " . . . job description might more accurately be described as my wife's assistant." (R. 576). 
5 
parties; and to draft and transmit letters to Mrs. Olch's clients, including the Buyer in this case. 
(R. 593-95, 605-10, 625). 
On January 16, 1994, the Buyer signed and delivered to the Sellers a written offer 
("Offer") to purchase the Property for $880,000. (R. 71, 133). The Offer, a copy of which is 
attached as Addenda E, specified the only manner in which it could be accepted: 
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, 
responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the 
offer or counter where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) 
communicates to the other party or the other party's agent that the 
offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
In response to the Offer, the Sellers signed and delivered to Mrs. Olch a counteroffer 
("Counteroffer") offering to sell the Property for $967,350. (R. 72, 136, 746-49). Mrs. Olch 
then had her assistant, Doordan, compose and type a cover letter to accompany the Counteroffer 
to the Buyer. (R. 594, 610). The Counteroffer, a copy of which is attached as Addenda F, 
provided that the Buyer had until January 28, 1994 " . . . to accept the terms of this 
[Counteroffer] in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of [the Offer]." (R. 136). The 
Buyer never understood that the Counteroffer was irrevocable. (R. 104). 
On January 27, 1994 at 2:02 p.m., the Sellers called the Brokerage Company's office 
in Park City, Utah to revoke the Counteroffer. (R. 559). The Sellers' call to the Brokerage 
Company was answered by Doordan - Mrs. Olch's assistant. (R. 559, 576). The Sellers knew 
at that time that Doordan was an assistant for both Mr. Olch and Mrs. Olch and that Doordan 
was and had been available to resolve transactional issues that had previously arisen in 
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connection with the Property. (R. 559-60). Informed that Mr. Olch was not in the office, the 
Sellers told Doordan that they had decided to withdraw the Counteroffer and instructed her to 
immediately take all action necessary to accomplish that purpose. (R. 560, 613-15). Doordan 
said she would do so. (R. 560, 613-15). The Sellers' telephone call with Doordan lasted for 
six minutes, terminating at 2:07 p.m. (R. 560, 564).4 
After receiving the Sellers' instruction to revoke the Counteroffer, Doordan's "mind set" 
was to assure that Mr. Olch was informed of that fact. (R. 615). Doordan accordingly felt a 
"sense of urgency" to take care of the matter. (R. 587). She knew that when Mr. Olch was not 
in the office, he would take his cellular telephone with him and that she could reach him on that 
phone if she " . . . had something to tell him." (R. 611). "Responding as quickly as she could 
to [the Sellers'] request [to revoke the Counteroffer]," R. 587, Doordan reached Mr. Olch on 
his cellular telephone in Salt Lake City and told him that the Sellers had "just called" to revoke 
the Counteroffer. (R. 586-87). Mr. Olch's cellular telephone records reflect an incoming call 
4
 The proposition that a six minute telephone call that begins at 2:02 p.m. terminates by 2:07 p.m. is illustrated 
as follows: 
Time of Call Number of Minutes Elapsed 
2:02 p.m. 1 
2:03 p.m. 2 
2:04 p.m. 3 
2:05 p.m. 4 
2:06 p.m. 5 
2:07 p.m. 6 
Because Doordan's telephone conference with the Sellers ended at 2:07 p.m., Doordan was physically able 
to call Mr. Olch during the same minute at 2:07 p.m. (the point at which his cellular telephone bill reflects his 
receipt of an incoming call from Park City) with the news that the Sellers had just revoked the Counteroffer. 
7 
from Park City5 — the location at which the Sellers had just reached Doordan — which began 
at 2:07 p.m., the same minute during which the telephone conversation between the Sellers and 
Doordan ended. (R. 557). This call between Doordan and Mr. Olch lasted for three minutes. 
(Id.). 
Two minutes later at 2:11 p.m., Mr. Olch called the Buyer's agent, Mrs. Olch (his wife), 
at her home office. (R. 553, 598). Although this call lasted for three minutes and came on the 
heels of Doordan's two-minute-old telephone conversation with Mr. Olch, the Olches - who 
stood to make a combined commission of nearly $60,000 if the Buyer purchased the Property 
— both denied that Mr. Olch told Mrs. Olch at this time that the Sellers had revoked the 
Counteroffer. (R. 125, 579-80).6 Although the Counteroffer, by its terms, was to remain open 
until the following day at 5:00 p.m., Mrs. Olch told Mr. Olch during their telephone 
5
 The Buyer submitted an affidavit from the telephone provider that the reference to "Park City" on the bill did 
not necessarily mean that it originated in Park City. (R. 688-90). However, given the undisputed fact that 
Doordan's call to Mr. Olch immediately followed the six-minute call she received from the Sellers beginning at 
2:02 p.m., the inference is irresistible that it was Doordan who called Mr. Olch at 2:07 p.m. to inform him of the 
Sellers' revocation. 
6
 As demonstrated in Argument B at pages 14-18 infra, the Olches' denial is unconvincing. Mr. Olch's call 
to his wife was initiated only two minutes after Doordan told him of the Sellers' revocation of the Counteroffer. 
His call was an immediate, spontaneous reaction designed to impart to Mrs. Olch the critical information that he 
had just received from Doordan. It defies credulity to believe that during their three minute discussion Mr. Olch 
never once raised with Mrs. Olch the subject of the Sellers' minutes-old revocation. At a factual level, Mr. Olch 
was well aware of the Sellers' revocation and had three minutes of easy, unfettered opportunity to tell his wife of 
the revocation. At a legal level, Mr. Olch owed the Sellers an undivided fiduciary duty of loyalty and diligence 
to immediately inform his wife of the revocation. At an intuitive level, it makes no sense that Mr. Olch discoursed 
with his wife on any topic other than the one Doordan had only moments earlier so urgently and unequivocally 
raised with him. The inference is irresistible, therefore, that Mrs. Olch - the Buyer's agent - was informed of 
the Sellers' revocation by 2:14 p.m., some seventy minutes before the Buyer's attempted acceptance at 
approximately 3:25 p.m. 
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conversation at 2:11 p.m. that she was then feeling ". . . a sense of urgency about getting [the 
Buyer's] signed acceptance back from Ohio." (R. 591).7 
In the meantime, "no later than 3:25" that afternoon, R. 173, Doordan called the Buyer's 
"administrative assistant," R. 491,8 in Ohio and read her the following message: 
Jim Berkus the current owner of Lot 14 has instructed me to send 
you this message. He is reconsidering his position in this 
transaction and in his words 'taking the offer off the table' for 24 
hours. He will make a decision by 2:10 p.m. MST on Friday, 
January 28. I am acting in the absence of Jon Olch and acting on 
the authority of Jim Berkus. 
At the same time -- 3:25 p.m. — Doordan telefaxed the foregoing notification to the Buyer's 
office. (R. 623). At "approximately 3:25 p.m.," Mrs. Olch told Mr. Olch that the Buyer had 
signed the Counteroffer. (R.125).9 It is unclear from the deposition testimony whether 
Doordan's telephonic notification to the Buyer's administrative assistant "no later than 
7
 Mr. Olch testified in his deposition that he did not know why his wife felt this "sense of urgency." (R. 591). 
The obvious explanation, however, is that he in fact told his wife (the Buyer's agent) of the Sellers' revocation 
during their 2:11 p.m. telephone conversation. 
In any event, Mrs. Olch testified that her increasing "concern" about getting the Buyer to fax his signed 
acceptance to her was prompted by her knowledge that " . . . there was another offer [from a third-party] about to 
be submitted or there were some other people getting close to the lot." (R. 599). Indeed, Mrs. Olch's level of 
"concern" about expediting the Buyer's return of the signed acceptance of the Counteroffer was higher " . . . 
between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on the 27th than it had been before." (R. 599). Given the fact that the 
Counteroffer was, by its own terms, to remain open until 5:00 p.m. the following day, Mrs. Olch's explanation as 
to why her anxiety level was rapidly escalating is implausible. 
8
 Mrs. Olch understood that the Buyer's administrative assistant had responsibility for doing "the actual faxing" 
of the Counteroffer. (R. 602). To the extent that Mrs. Olch was unable to reach the Buyer, she would 
"sometimes" speak with the Buyer's administrative assistant. (Id.). 
9
 Thus, it was not until "approximately 3:25 p.m." that the Buyer finally completed his acceptance of the 
Counteroffer in the manner required by paragraph 23 of the initial Offer by having his agent inform the Sellers' 
agent that he had signed the Counteroffer. 
9 
3:25 p.m." preceded or followed Mrs. Olch's notification to Mr. Olch at "approximately 3:25 
p.m." that she had just received the Buyer's signed acceptance of the Counteroffer. (R. 588-90, 
603, 616, 620, 623, 624). 
In the face of these facts, the trial court nevertheless concluded as a matter of a law that 
the Buyer's acceptance of the Counteroffer preceded the Sellers' revocation of the Counteroffer. 
(R. 738-39). On that basis, the court ruled that the parties reached a specifically enforceable 
agreement. (R. 746-49). 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There are three independent reasons why the trial court's Summary Judgment Orders 
must be reversed. 
First, the record establishes that Doordan — the assistant for the Buyer's agent — was 
actually serving or apparently serving as an agent for the Buyer's agent in the attempted sale and 
purchase of the Property. As such, when the Sellers notified Doordan at 2:02 p.m. of their 
intent to revoke the Counteroffer, the notification was, as a matter of law, imputed both to the 
Buyer's agent and the Buyer. Because that notification preceded the Buyer's attempted 
acceptance, no contract arose. The Summary Judgment Orders and the Specific Performance 
Judgment must be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the Sellers as a matter of law. 
Next, there is strong circumstantial evidence that during their 2:11 p.m. telephone call, 
the Buyer's agent was actually notified by the Sellers' agent that the Counteroffer had been 
10 
revoked. This notification was made more than one hour before the Buyer completed his 
attempted acceptance of the Counteroffer at "approximately 3:25 p.m." The sequence and 
timing of the flurry of telephone calls between the Sellers and Doordan, between Doordan and 
Mr. Olch, between Mr. Olch and Mrs. Olch, and between Mrs. Olch and the Buyer support the 
reasonable inference that the Buyer's agent was well aware of the Sellers' revocation before the 
Buyer completed his acceptance. This inference, by itself, creates a triable issue of fact as to 
whether the Sellers' revocation of the Counteroffer preceded or followed the Buyer's acceptance. 
Finally, the factual record does not establish whether the Buyer's attempted completion 
of his acceptance of the Counteroffer at "approximately 3:25 p.m." occurred before or after 
Doordan telephonically notified the Buyer's administrative assistant and faxed the notice of 
revocation to the Buyer at "no later than 3:25 p.m." This plainly important triable issue of fact 
precludes the entry of summary judgment. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT DOORDAN WAS ACTUALLY SERVING 
OR APPARENTLY SERVING AS AN AGENT FOR THE BUYER'S REAL 
ESTATE BROKER. AS SUCH. THE SELLERS' NOTIFICATION TO HER AT 
2:02 P.M. OF THEIR INTENT TO REVOKE THE COUNTEROFFER 
CONSTITUTES NOTIFICATION TO THE BUYER. BECAUSE THAT 
NOTIFICATION PRECEDED THE BUYER'S ATTEMPTED COMPLETION OF 
HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE COUNTEROFFER AT 3:35 P.M., NO CONTRACT 
AROSE. 
It is a basic rule of agency law that "[u]nless the notifier has notice that the agent has an 
interest adverse to the principal, a notification given to an agent is notice to the principal if it 
11 
is given to an agent authorized to receive it [or] to an agent apparently authorized to receive it." 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 268(l)(a) and (b) (1958). This rule applies with equal force 
to " . . . a servant, subservant or other subagent which the servant or subagent had a duty to act 
upon or to communicate to the agent or to the principal because of his employment or apparent 
employment." Id. at § 283(a). "A person has notice of a fact if his agent has knowledge of the 
fact, reason to know it or should know it, or has been given a notification of it, under 
circumstances coming within the rules applying to the liability of a principal because of notice 
to his agent." Id. at § 9(3). Therefore, " . . . notice to a subagent who is under a duty to 
communicate the notice to the agent is effective to the same extent as if notice had been given 
to the agent." Stortroen v. Beneficial Fin. Co.. 736 P.2d 391, 396 (Colo. 1987). 
These settled principles of agency law cannot be circumvented by attaching the label of 
"independent contractor" to describe the legal relationship between the Buyer's agent and her 
husband's Brokerage Company with whom she was affiliated. Rule 6.2.9.2 of the 
Administrative Rules of the Division of Real Estate, see Addenda D, states that "[t]he existence 
of an independent contractor relationship or any other special compensation arrangement between 
the broker and affiliated licensee shall not release the broker and licensees of any duties, 
obligations, or responsibilities." In other words, the Buyer's agent cannot insulate herself from 
notifications given to her assistant by claiming that she or her assistant is an independent 
contractor, and not an employee, of the Brokerage Company. 
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The record in this case establishes that Doordan served as Mrs. Olch's assistant and 
performed significant work for Mrs. Olch in connection with the Property. Mr. Olch — the 
principal broker and president of the Brokerage Company — testified in his deposition that 
Doordan's " . . . job description might more accurately be described as my wife's assistant." 
(R. 576). The scope of Doordan's duties for Mrs. Olch was extensive: Mrs. Olch had given 
Doordan authority to sign checks on her behalf; to assist her in transmitting offers, 
counteroffers, acceptances and other communications between transacting parties; and to prepare 
and transmit letters to Mrs. Olch's clients, including the Buyer. (R. 593-95, 605-10, 625). Not 
only did Doordan have actual authority to act on Mrs. Olch's behalf, she had apparent authority 
to do so. The Sellers knew from their previous contacts with Doordan that she was closely 
involved with communicating the respective positions of the parties, including the faxing of 
transactional documents. (R. 559). The Sellers' agent had previously informed the Sellers that 
Doordan was assisting both the Sellers' agent and the Buyer's agent in connection with the sale 
of the Property and that if the Sellers' agent was unavailable, Doordan would have up-to-the 
minute information as to its status. (Id.). 
Doordan's role as Mrs. Olch's assistant — a role in which Doordan was authorized to 
perform and in fact performed significant transactional functions for Mrs. Olch — renders 
Doordan a subagent of the Buyer. Because Doordan was serving as the Buyer's subagent, the 
Buyer is, as a matter of law, deemed to have notice of the Sellers' revocation at 2:02 p.m. on 
January 27, 1994. Restatement (Second) of Agency. §§ 9(3), 268 and 283 (1958). Therefore, 
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the Counteroffer was revoked more than one hour before the Buyer completed his attempted 
acceptance at "about 3:25 p.m." Thus, as a matter of law, no contract was ever reached. At 
the very least, there is a hotly disputed factual issue regarding the nature and extent of 
Doordan's legal relationship with the Brokerage Company, with the Buyer's agent, and with the 
Buyer. This factual dispute is fatal to the Summary Judgment Orders. 
B. BECAUSE THE RECORD IS REPLETE WITH COMPELLING 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE BUYER'S AGENT, MRS, OLCH. 
WAS INFORMED OF THE SELLERS' REVOCATION OF THE 
COUNTEROFFER BEFORE THE BUYER COMPLETED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF 
THE COUNTEROFFER, THE SELLERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF 
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THAT EVIDENCE, 
Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, "[i]t only takes one sworn statement 
under oath to dispute the averments on either side of the controversy and create an issue of 
fact." Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). A triable issue of fact exists 
when the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence create a genuine dispute about 
a material point of the case. CJL Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min.. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304, 
1307-08 (Utah 1987). This Court has long held that the party against whom summary judgment 
is sought " . . . is entitled to the benefit of having the court consider all the facts presented, and 
every inference fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to him." Morris v. 
Farnsworth Motel. 259 P.2d 297, 298 (Utah 1953). 
This basic principle of summary judgment practice has been repeatedly recognized. See 
e.g. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah 1993) ("we view the facts and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing a motion for 
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summary judgment"); Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App. 
1989) ("because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the 
merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor of the opposing party"); Frederick May 
& Co. v. Dunn. 368 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962) ("to sustain a summary judgment, the 
pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the loser, 
must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the winner is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Such showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable 
possibility that the loser could win if given a trial"). 
The process of drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence in the context of a 
motion for summary judgment has been usefully explained as follows: 
Inferences must also be drawn in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party . . . . Inferences may be drawn from 
underlying facts that are not in dispute, such as background or 
contextual facts . . . , and from underlying facts on which there is 
conflicting direct evidence but which the judge must assume may 
be resolved at trial in favor of the non-moving party. Assuming 
the existence of these underlying facts, however, an inference as 
to another material fact may be drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party only if it is 'rational' or 'reasonable' and otherwise 
permissible under the governing substantive law. 
McLaughlin v. Liu. 849 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1988). In other words, the court can 
refuse to draw the requested inference from circumstantial evidence only if the inference is 
"implausible." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 593 (1986). 
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In this case, the inference that plaintiffs agent, Mrs. Olch, had actual knowledge of the 
Sellers' revocation before the Buyer attempted to accept the Counteroffer is anything but 
"implausible." Matsushita. 475 U.S. at 593. In a telephone call from 2:02 p.m. to 2:07 p.m., 
the Sellers told Doordan that they had decided to revoke the Counteroffer. (R. 559). The 
Sellers instructed her to immediately take all action, if any, necessary to complete the 
revocation. (R. 560, 613-15). Doordan was acutely aware of the need to take "immediate" 
action and felt a "sense of urgency." (R. 587, 615). She immediately called the Sellers' agent, 
Mr. Olch, and told him of the Sellers' revocation. (R. 586-87). Less than three minutes later 
at 2:11 p.m. - 39 minutes before the Buyer affixed his signature to the Counteroffer to signify 
his "acceptance" and about 74 minutes before that "acceptance" was communicated to the 
Sellers' agent in the manner required by the Counteroffer - Mr. Olch spoke with the Buyer's 
agent, Mrs. Olch. (R. 553, 598). 
Astoundingly, Mr. Olch denies that he informed his wife during this conversation of the 
Sellers' revocation.10 His denial ignores the reality that his telephone call was an immediate, 
spontaneous reaction designed to impart to Mrs. Olch the critical information that he had just 
received from Doordan. It is preposterous to believe that during their three minute discussion 
10
 Mr. Olch does, however, acknowledge that Mrs. Olch told him during this call that even though the 
Counteroffer stated that it was to remain open until the following day at 5:00 p.m., she felt "a sense of urgency 
about getting [the Buyer's] signed acceptance [of the Counteroffer] back from Ohio." (R. 591). This "sense of 
urgency" became one of apparent desperation. Only fourteen minutes after her telephone conversation with Mr. 
Olch, and 32 minutes after her last telephone conversation with the Buyer, Mrs. Olch again attempted to call the 
Buyer. (R. 633). When the Buyer returned that call several minutes later at 2:39 p.m., Mrs. Olch " . . . knew that 
[the Buyer] had to get going on [signing and returning the Counteroffer]." (R. 600). This clear sense of urgency 
supports the inference that Mrs. Olch ~ the Buyer's agent — knew from her previous discussion with Mr. Olch at 
2:11 p.m. that the Sellers had revoked the Counteroffer. 
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Mr. Olch never once raised with Mrs. Olch the subject of the Sellers' seconds-old revocation. 
Factually, Mr. Olch well knew of the Sellers' revocation and had three minutes of unrestricted 
opportunity to tell his wife of the revocation. Legally, Mr. Olch owed the Sellers an undivided 
fiduciary duty of loyalty and due care to promptly inform his wife of the revocation. Intuitively, 
it makes no sense that Mr. Olch discoursed with his wife on any subject other than the one 
Doordan had only moments earlier so urgently raised with him. The inference is irresistible, 
therefore, that Mrs. Olch -- the Buyer's agent ~ was informed of the Sellers' revocation by 2:14 
p.m., some seventy minutes before the Buyer completed his attempted acceptance at about 
3:25 p.m. 
Moreover, between 2:15 and 2:40 p.m. that day, Mr. Olch learned that another 
prospective buyer had submitted a back-up offer to purchase the Property. (R. 583). Mr. Olch 
advised Mrs. Olch of this development "shortly" thereafter. (R. 588). Mrs. Olch acknowledges 
that she learned of the back-up offer from Mr. Olch or Doordan sometime after 1:30 p.m. 
(R.596, 597, 601). Thus, there is a strong inference that even if Mr. Olch inexplicably failed 
to advise Mrs. Olch during their three-minute telephone conversation at 2:11 p.m. that the 
Sellers had revoked the Counteroffer, Mr. Olch advised Mrs. Olch of the revocation some time 
after 2:15 p.m. (the first point at which he could have learned of the third-party back-up offer) 
and some time before about 3:25 p.m. (the point at which Mrs. Olch communicated to Mr. Olch 
the Buyer's "acceptance" of the Counteroffer). 
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It is clear as a matter of permissible and plausible inference, therefore, that the Oldies' 
claim that neither the Buyer's agent (Mrs. Olch) nor subagent (Doordan) knew of the Sellers' 
revocation until after the Buyer had accepted the Counteroffer is false. It is a claim that is 
contradicted by direct testimonial and documentary evidence, by reasonable inferences from that 
evidence, and by plain common sense. The obvious conflict in the evidence is fatal to the 
Summary Judgment Orders. 
C. THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT THE EARLIEST POINT AT WHICH THE 
BUYER COMPLETED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE COUNTEROFFER IN THE 
MANNER REQUIRED BY THE COUNTEROFFER WAS APPROXIMATELY 
3:25 P.M. ON JANUARY 27. 1994, BECAUSE THE RECORD IS UNCLEAR 
WHETHER THE SELLERS' NOTICE OF REVOCATION TO THE BUYER'S 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT "NO LATER THAN 3:25 P.M." PRECEDED OR 
FOLLOWED THE BUYER'S ATTEMPTED ACCEPTANCE. THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ORDERS CANNOT STAND. 
It is settled Utah law that "[i]n making an offer, the offeror may specify the manner in 
which the offer must be accepted. If the offer is not accepted in the specified manner, mutual 
assent is lacking and no contract is formed." Crane v. Timberbrook Village. Ltd.. 774 P.2d 3, 
4 (Utah App. 1989). Accord. J. R. Stone Co. v. Keate. 576 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah 1978). As 
this Court has explained: 
Under basic contract theory, generally a contract arises from the time that the 
agent of the offeree communicates the acceptance of his principal to the offeror. 
These general rules, however, may be modified by the express terms of the offer. 
'If the offeror prescribes the only way in which his offer must be accepted, an 
acceptance in any other way is a counteroffer.' 
Frandsen v. Gerstner. 487 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1971). In Frandsen. the offer specified that it 
was made "subject to the written acceptance of the [offeree] endorsed hereon." Rather than 
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signing the offer, however, the offeree telegraphed his "acceptance" to his real estate agent. The 
agent then attached the telegram to the offer and wrote "accepted as per terms of [t]elegram." 
In reversing the trial court's decision that a contract had been formed, the Court held that 
because "defendants have never endorsed their acceptance of the offer," and because there was 
no written instrument authorizing their agent to accept the offer on their behalf, there was no 
basis for specific performance. 487 P.2d at 700. 
The rationale for the principle that any variance between the prescribed method of 
acceptance and the actual attempt at acceptance is fatal to the formation of a contract is that "the 
offeror is the master of his offer, and his provision as to the time, place and manner or mode 
of acceptance must be complied with." Glenwav Indus.. Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frve. Inc.. 686 
F.2d 415, 417 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting Van Schoiack v. United States Liab. Ins. Co.. 133 A.2d 
509 (Pa. 1957). In other words, "[a]s he is free not to make any offer at all, a person making 
an offer is free to restrict the power of acceptance in any way, reasonable or unreasonable, that 
he may wish." Kurio v. United States. 429 F. Supp. 42, 64 (S.D. Tex. 1970). Thus, until the 
offeree accepts the offer in the precise manner prescribed by the offeror, no contract is formed. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. § 60 ("If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of 
acceptance, its terms in this respect must be complied with in order to create a contract."). 
This principle defeats the Buyer's claim that he somehow "accepted" the Counteroffer 
before 3:25 p.m. on January 27, 1994. The Counteroffer expressly required the occurrence of 
two specified events before any "acceptance" could arise: (i) the Buyer must have signed the 
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Counteroffer to indicate his acceptance, and (ii) the Buyer must have communicated to the 
Sellers or their agent that the Counteroffer had been so signed. (Counteroffer, t 23). Although 
the Buyer asserts that he orally accepted the Counteroffer at 1:55 p.m., and that his agent, 
Mrs. Olch, informed the Sellers' agent, Mr. Olch, of that oral acceptance at "approximately 
2:11 p.m.," see R. 125, it is obvious that the attempted oral "acceptance" could not and did not 
constitute a legally sufficient acceptance in the express manner required by paragraph 23 of the 
Offer. That paragraph states that unless and until the Buyer signed the Counteroffer to indicate 
acceptance (an act that indisputably occurred at 2:50 p.m.) (R. 138) and communicated to the 
Sellers or their agent that the Counteroffer had been signed as required (an act that indisputably 
occurred at "approximately 3:25 p.m.") (R. 125) no acceptance arose. Because the Buyer's oral 
acceptance of the Counteroffer at 1:55 p.m. and his agent's notification to the Buyer's agent of 
the oral acceptance at 2:11 p.m. preceded the Buyer's written acceptance of the Counteroffer 
at 2:50 p.m. and his agent's communication of the acceptance to the Buyer's agent at 
"approximately 3:25 p.m.," the earliest point at which the Counteroffer was accepted in the 
manner specified by the Offer was "approximately 3:25 p.m." Whether that acceptance 
preceded or followed the notice of revocation that Doordan telephonically read to the Buyer's 
administrative assistant and telefaxed to the Buyer "no later than 3:25 p.m." is not resolvable 
through summary judgment. 
In the final analysis, the parties contractually specified the precise manner in which 
acceptance was to occur: the affixing of the Buyer's signature to the Counteroffer to indicate 
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acceptance and actual "communication" to the Sellers or their agent of the acceptance. As such, 
the earliest point at which a legally valid acceptance could have occurred was "approximately 
3:25 p.m." Because the record does not establish whether the Buyer's completion of his 
acceptance at "approximately 3:25 p.m." occurred before or after Doordan telephonically read 
to the Buyer's administrative assistant and faxed the notice of revocation to the Buyer "no later 
than 3:25 p.m.," see R. 588-90, 603, 616, 620, 623-24, 633-34, the Summary Judgment Orders 
must be reversed. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment Orders and the Specific Performance Judgment cannot stand. 
The Sellers' notice of revocation to the assistant of the Buyer's agent at 2:02 p.m. on January 
27, 1994 constitutes notice to the Buyer more than one hour before he completed his attempted 
acceptance. For this reason, the Summary Judgment Orders and the Specific Performance 
Judgment must be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the Sellers as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, the myriad factual disputes regarding the sequence, timing and substance of the 
parties' and their agents' conversations during that remarkable afternoon can be resolved only 
through a plenary development of the relevant facts at trial. For this reason, the Summary 
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Judgment Orders and Specific Performance Judgment must be reversed and the case remanded 
for trial. 
DATED this /ST day of April, 1996. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
*4*-^ 
John TXAnderson 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
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Mark J. Williams, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
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VAN COST, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Bryon J. Benevento (5254) 
Guy P. Kroesche (4749) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. 
WALTER J. 
WALTER, ' ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ; 
and RIA N. BERKUS, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
1 PLAINTIFF 
i. Civil No. 94-03-00046CN 
) Honorable Glenn Iwasaki 
Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court 
for oral argument on Thursday, December 1, 1994. Plaintiff was 
represented by Bryon J. Benevento. Defendants were represented 
by John T. Anderson. The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki presided. 
Based upon the parties' motions for summary judgment, the 
memorandums submitted in support and opposition to the cross-
motions for summary judgment, the affidavits of Janet Olch and 
Kate Doordan, oral argument of counsel and for other good cause 
appearing thereon; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
2. Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment on his 
First Claim for Relief (Specific Performance) is granted in 
part. The Court finds as a matter of law the following: 
a. That Bald Eagle Realty and Jon Olch were 
defendants' real estate agents. 
b. That Janet Olch was plaintiff s real estate 
sales agent. 
c. That Janet 01,ch was an independent 
contractor and not an employee of Bald Eagle Realty. 
As such, she was not imputed with any knowledge that 
Bald Eagle Realty or Jon Olch may have had relating 
to defendants' attempt to revoke their counteroffer. 
d. That Janet Olch did not have knowledge of 
defendants' attempt to revoke the counteroffer until 
after she had communicated plaintiff s acceptance of 
the counteroffer to defendants' agent. 
I 196X67979 i 2 
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I 
e. That Janet 01ch was not serving in a dual 
representative capacity for both the plaintiff and 
defendants. 
f. That Bald Eagle Realty and/or Jon Olch were 
not serving in a dual representative capacity for 
both the plaintiff and defendants. 
3. The Court takes under advisement the issue of 
whether plaintiff was notified directly by Bald Eagle Realty of 
defendants' attempt to revoke their counteroffer prior to his 
acceptance. Defendants are ordered to submit a supplemental 
brief on this limited issue by December 7, 1994. Thereafter, 
plaintiff shall submit a reply brief by December 12, 1994. 
DATED this ^7 day of December, 1994. 
BY THE CO 
HONORABLE GLENN IWASAKI 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
vu^ X. *~ac-* 
John T. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
/ d a t e 'l/r /<?v 
196X67979.1 3 
e. That Janet 01ch was not serving in a dual 
representative capacity for both the plaintiff and 
defendants. 
f. That Bald Eagle Realty and/or Jon 01ch were 
not serving in a dual representative capacity for 
both the plaintiff and defendants. 
3. The Court takes under advisement the issue of 
whether plaintiff was notified directly by Bald Eagle Realty of 
defendants' attempt to revoke their counteroffer prior to his 
acceptance. Defendants are ordered to submit a supplemental 
brief on this limited issue by December 7, 1994. Thereafter, 
plaintiff shall submit a reply brief by December 12, 1994. 
DATED this C1 day of December, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
AL 
HONORABLE GLENN IWASAKI 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
J ^ K^A^JJL^^^ /date_ 'i/r /<?y 
John Tv Anderson 




VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Bryon J. Benevento (52S4) 
Guy P. Kroesche (4749) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1S00 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
F I L E D 
OCT lb $95 
dark of Summit County 
ScprtyCUck 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. WALTER, 
Plaintiff, 
THE JAMES AND RIA N. BERKUS 
LIVING TRUST, JAMES BERKUS 
and RIA N. BERKUS, AS 




FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No, 94-03-Q0046CN 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came before 
this Court for hearing on Monday, September 25, 1995. 
Plaintiff was represented by Bryon J. Benevento. Defendants 
were represented by John T. Anderson. Based upon this Court's 
prior Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment for Plaintiff, 
the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff's 
supporting memoranda, the Affidavits of Jeri Pacheco, Katie 
196\S779S.l 
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Jenkins, James Berkus and Joel Silver, the deposition 
transcripts of Janet Olch, John Olch and Kate Doordan Klavan, 
the Defendants' opposing memoranda, the pleadings on file with 
the Court, oral argument of counsel, and for other good cause 
appearing thereon; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. Defendants have failed to present sufficient evidence j 
to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether j 
plaintiff was notified of defendants' attempt: to revoke their 
counteroffer prior to his acceptance. The record demonstrates | 
! 
that plaintiff was not informed of defendants' attempt to j 
revoke their counteroffer until after his acceptance was J 
I 
communicated to defendants' real estate agent. I 
2. The record further demonstrates that Katie 
i 
Jenkins was not plaintiff's agent for the purpose of receiving j 
notice of defendants' attempt to revoke their counteroffer. | 
Accordingly, any facts disclosed to Ms. Jenkins cannot be i 
imputed to plaintiff. 
3. The record further demonstrates that Kate J 
Doordan Klavan was not plaintiff's subagent for the purpose of j 
receiving notice of defendants' attempt to revoke their } 
i*\!779S.l * 
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counteroffer. Accordingly, any facts disclosed to Ms. Klavan 
cannot be imputed to plaintiff. 
4. Defendants' arguments regarding the subject 
matter of any communications between the parties' real estate 
agents that allegedly occurred before plaintiff accepted the 
counteroffer are mere speculation and do not create a genuine 
issue of material fact upon which reasonable minds could 
differ. 
THEREFORE, this Court enters judgment on behalf of 
the plaintiff and against defendants on his First Claim for 
Relief for specific performance. p 
DATED this S (C day of r 7 V. , , 1995 
BY THE COURT: 
Frank G. Noel 
Third District Court^ 
Approved as to form: 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John T-. Anderson 
Attorney for Defendants 
Viwd/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 
3 ' day of SepssRfeer, 1995, to the following: 
John T. Anderson 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway 
700 Bank One Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert R. Wallace, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Bryon J. Benevento, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 




. * < > . . _ 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Bryon J. Benevento (5254) 
Craig W. Dallon (5940) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
 3 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
F I L E D 
DEC 1 5 1975 |d '.06 
GierK or Summit County y 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. WALTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE JAMES AND RIA N. BERKUS 
LIVING TRUST, JAMES BERKUS 
and RIA N. BERKUS, AS 
GRANTORS AND TRUSTEES, 
Defendants. 




BALD EAGLE REALTY, INC. , a 
Utah corporation, JONATHAN 
OLCH and KATE DOORDAN, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
JUDGMENT OF SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE 
Civil No. 94-03-00046CN 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
J96VS8947 1 
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BASED UPON this Court's Order Granting Plaintiff 
Summary Judgment of Specific Performance, Plaintiff is hereby 
awarded judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. Defendants shall convey to Plaintiff fee simple 
title to the following real property: 
Unit 14, THE BALD EAGLE CLUB AT DEER 
VALLEY, an Expandable Utah Condominium 
Project, together with an undivided l/53rd 
ownership interest in and to the common 
areas and facilities of the project as the 
same are identified and established in the 
Record of Survey Map recorded August 3, 
1989 as Entry No. 311265 of the Official 
Records in the office of the Summit County 
Recorder, and recorded August 3, 1989 as 
Entry No. 149482 in Book 210 at Page 359 of 
the Official Records in the office of the 
Wasatch County Recorder; and the 
Declaration of Condominium for The Bald 
Eagle Club at Deer Valley recorded August 
3, 1989 as Entry No. 311266 in Book 530 at 
Page 295 of the Official Records in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder and 
recorded August 3, 1989 as Entry No. 149483 
in Book 210 at Page 389 of the Official 
Records in the office of the Wasatch County 
Recorder; and the First Amendment to Record 
of Survey Map recorded April 18, 1990 as 
Entry No. 151947 in Book 217 at Page 479 of 
the Official Records in the office of the 
Wasatch County Recorder and recorded April 
20, 1990 as Entry No. 323408 of the 
official records in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder and the First 
Amendment to Condominium Declaration 
recorded April 18, 1990 as Entry No. 151948 
in Book 217 at Page 499 of the Official 
Records in the office of the Wasatch County 
Recorder and recorded April 20, 1990 as 
Entry No. 323409 in Book 561 at Page 653 in 
the office of the Summit County Recorder, 
196V88947 1 2 
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and the First Amendment to Record of Survey 
Map for an Expandable Condominium Project 
called The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley 
recorded August 21, 1990 as Entry No. 
153081 in Book 221 at Page 230 of the 
Official Records in the office of the 
Wasatch County Recorder and recorded August 
21, 1990 as Entry No. 328322 of the 
Official Records in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder. 
2. Plaintiff shall pay the Defendants the amount 
of $967,350.00 ($940,000.00 as the purchase price and 
$27,350.00 as interest under the Bellevue Condominium Escrow) 
in consideration for the conveyance of the real property 
referenced in paragraph 1 above from which the sum of 
$56,400.00, which represents the commission claimed by Bald 
Eagle Realty, shall be paid into the Registry of the Court, and 
held in an interest-bearing account subject to a final 
disposition of the Third-Party Complaint by order of this 
Court. 
3. The closing of the conveyance (the "Closing") 
shall be held at the offices of High Country Title (the "Escrow 
Agent"), at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on or before the *eth day of 
1> Naa^mbor, 1995, or at such other place and time as shall be 
mutually agreed to, in writing, by the Plaintiff and the 
Defendants. The date upon which the Closing actually takes 
place or, if more than one (1) day is required to complete the 
Closing, the date upon which the Closing is actually 
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accomplished, shall be deemed and considered the "Closing 
Date." At the Closing, the following shall occur, each of 
which shall be considered a condition precedent to the other 
and all of which shall be considered as taking place 
simultaneously: 
a. The Defendants shall execute and deliver to 
the Escrow Agent, in escrow, a general warranty deed 
for the subject property. 
b. The Plaintiff shall deliver to the Escrow 
Agent, in escrow, the consideration for the subject 
property. 
c. The Defendants and the Plaintiff shall 
execute and deliver to each other such other 
documents (including without limitation closing 
statements) and take such other actions as necessary 
and appropriate to effectuate the Closing in 
accordance herewith and with the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. 
4. The Plaintiff shall reasonably cooperate with 
the Defendants to effectuate an exchange of the subject 
property in accordance with the provisions of Section 1031 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the 
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regulations promulgated thereunder, subject to the following 
limitations: 
a. The Plaintiff shall incur no additional 
costs or expenses in connection with the exchange; 
b. The purchase and sale of the subject 
property shall not be delayed by reason of the 
exchange; and 
c. The Plaintiff shall have no responsibility 
to ensure the Defendants' intended tax consequences. 
5. Defendants' Counterclaim against Plaintiff is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
6. Plaintiff shall be awarded his Court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this matter 
to judgment as established by affidavit of counsel 
DATED this /^j day of V)J&U
 J 1995 
BY THE COURT 
^-^ 
Approved as to form: 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 




Attorney for Defendants 
HANSONf EPPERSON & SMITH 
| * \ COUNTY / £ ! 
' " " / f l l l U O ^ 
Mark J . 
Attorney 'for Third-Par ty Defendants 
~#**i#t \ w mnr i. h Q 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing JUDGMENT OF SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE to be mailed, postage prepaid, this /^ $T^ -day of 
_^_No2cejlS^ er, 1995, to the following: 
John T. Anderson 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway 
700 Bank One Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert R. Wallace, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Bryon J. Benevento, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
S a l t Lake City , Utah 84145-0340 
(Q j iWL- k/. ^*MA/1teD 
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Addendum D 
6.2.7.3 Disclosure to other agents. An agent who has established an agency 
relationship with a principal shall disclose who he or she represents to another agent 
upon initial contact with the other agent 11/15/93 
6.2.8 Duty to Inform. Sales agents and associate brokers must keep their principal 
broker or branch manager informed on a timely basis of all real estate transactions in 
which the licensee is involved, as agent or principal, in which the licensee has received 
funds on behalf of the principal broker or in which an offer has been written. 
10/18/91 
6.2.9 Broker Supervision. Principal brokers and associate brokers who are branch 
managers shall be responsible for exercising active supervision over the conduct of all 
licensees affiliated with them. 10/18/91 
6.2.9.1 A broker will not be held responsible for inadequate supervision if: 
(a) An affiliated licensee violates a provision of Section 61-2-1, et seq.* or the rules 
promulgated thereunder, in contravention of the supervising broker's specific written 
policies or instructions; and 3/1/94 
(b) Reasonable procedures were established by the broker to ensure that licensees 
receive adequate supervision and the broker has followed those procedures; and 
(c) Upon learning of the violation, the broker attempted to prevent or mitigate the 
damage; and 
(d) The broker did not participate in the violation; and 
(e) The broker did not ratify the violation; and 
(f) The broker did not attempt to avoid learning of the violation. 10/18/91 
6.2.9.2 The existence of an independent contractor relationship or any other special 
compensation arrangement between the broker and affiliated licensees shall not release 
the broker and licensees of any duties, obligations, or responsibilities, 
10/18/91 
6.2.10 Disclosure of Fees. If a real estate licensee who is acting as an agent in a 
transaction will receive any type of fee in connection with a real estate transaction in 
addition to a real estate commission, that fee must be disclosed in writing to all parties 
to the transaction. 10/18/91 
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H EAL ESTATE PURCHA&E, LV/M» . . Thk U > totally Mmllns Caauact. Utafc Slatt U * rtqatrtt that UcaiMd rwt eaiatf ateoH OK this form. hat Of 'and the Sttltr may 
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_ EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
T h e B o ^ Q & WAUTeufe , offers to purchase the Property described below and delivers 
. n p ^ ^ r T c l . ^ M ^ r . » ^ i » t b C > . C g > 0 I n t h e f o n n o f ^ h P ^ . - T R f ^ f r ^ i S tobedepositcd 
within three business days after Acceptance of this offer to purchase by alt parties. 
• ] W j > > g A / ^ L ^ ^ f ^ O t r / UoJS-Rccc ivcd by °" (Date) 
Brokerage ' Phone Number 
OFFERTO PURCHASE 
t. WQPBTV. \\fAvr m- T ^ A U ^ r A ^ ^ . ^ ^ A — — -
Htv A m u r \ V v l County S ^ P P i IT" ? U P A ^ ^ r r C H Utah. 
II Included Items Utiiess excluded herein, thiaaale shall include all fixtures presently attached to the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning 
and venting fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window 
and door screens, storm doors, window Winds, awnings, installed lelevision antenna, satellite dishes and system, wall-to-wail carpets, automatic garage 
door opener and transmiiicrO). fencing, trees and shrubs. The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate 
Bill of Sole with warranties as to title: A / t e » l / ^ - . ' 
1.2 Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this sale . 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. Buyer agrees to pay for the Property as follows: 
S SOj f lpO'*** Earnest Money Deposit 
i <3 Existing Loam Buyer agrees to assume and pay an existing loan in this approximate amount presently payable at S. 
per month including principal. Interest (presently at % per annum), D real estate taxes. D property insurance premium 
and D mortgage insurance premium. Buyer agreea to pay any transfer and assumptton fees. Seller O shall O shall not be 
released from liability on said loan. Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual 
balance at Closing shall be adjusted In DCash P Other 
!S Q Proceeds from New Loan: Buyer reserves the right to apply for any of the following loons under the terms described below. 
• Conventional O PHA DVA D Other . Seller agrees to pay $ toward 
Discount Points and Buyer's other loan and closing costs, to be allocated at Buyer's discretion. 
Q For a fixed rate loan: Amortized and payable over years, interest shall not exceed % per annum; monthly principal 
and interest payment shall not exceed * . or 
G For tin Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM)- Amortized and payable over _____ years; initial interest rair shall noi exceed % 
per annum: initial monthly principal and interest payments shall not exceed $ Maximum Life Time interest 
rate shall not exceed . % per annum. 
S _ j £ L Seller Financing: (See attached Seller Financing Addendum) 
1 O Other: -
S C S Q ^ C C Q L Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Closing 
s&bQsQQ- Total Purchase Price 
2.1 £«i*llng/New Loan Application. Buyer agrees to make application for a loan specified above within A/Ar calendar days (Application Date) 
altct Acceptance. Buyer will hove made l»au Application only when Buyer has: (a) completed, signed, ond delivered m the Lender the initial loan 
application and documentation required by the Lender; and (b) paid nil loan application fees as required by the Lender Buyer will continue to provide 
the Lender with my additional documentation as required by the* Lender. If. within seven calendar days after receipt of written request from Seller, Buyer 
tails to provide in Seller written evidence that Buyer has made taan Application by the Application Date, (hen Seller may. prior IO the Qualification 
Date below, cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Buyer. The Brokerage, upon receipt of atopy of such written notice. Muill release to Seller, 
and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization f rtmi 
Buyer 
1.2 Qualification Buyer and the Property must qualify for a loan for which application has been made under Section 2.1 within A/A calendar 
days (Qualification D«t*i after Acceptance The Property is deemed qualified If. on or before the Qualification Date, the Property , in tu current 
condition and for the Buyer's intended use, has appraised at a value not less than the Total Purchase Price. Buyer is deemed qualified If. on or before the 
Qualification Date, the lender verifies in writing that Buyer has been approved as of the verification date. 
2.3 Qualification Contingency. If Seller lias not previously voided this Contract as provided in Section 2.1. and either the Property or Buyer has 
failed to qualify on or before the Qualification Date, either party may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party within three 
calendar days after the Qualification Date, otherwise Buyer and the Property are deemed qualified. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of such written 
notice, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further wntten authorization of Seller. 
3. CLOSING. This transaction shall be closed on or belore I " $\ . 19 " 4 Closing shall occur when: (a) Buyer and Seller have 
signed arid delivered to each other (or to the escrow/title company), all documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instructions 
and by applicable law; and (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents, have been delivered to the escrow/title company in the form of 
cashier s chock, collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1/2) of the escrow Closing fee, unless otherwise agreed by die parties 
in writing. Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in this Section. Unearned 
deposits on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing. Prorations set forth in this Section, shall be made as of SSf date of Closing O date of 
possession Pother 
4. POSSESSION. Unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer WMNN AT hmin ..ft- Closing. 
5. CON Fl RM ATION OF AGENCY DISC LOSUR E. At the signing of this Contract th(llsting agent UaJ £ ) ICU represents 
0 Seller OBuver. and the selling agem^lA_KJ*r C)\CM mpn^nt. •Sejlal|pBuyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this 
Contract written disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her. C1 f If IP Buyer's Initials. ( ) Seller's Initials. 
6. TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE, (a) Seller has. or ahall ha^l t Cloiing. Zee title to the Property and agrees to convey such 
title to Buyer by general warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as warranted under Section (0.6; (b) Seller agrees to pay for and furnish Buyer 
at Closing with a current standard form owner'a policy of Utle insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price; (c) the title policy shall conform with 
Sellers obligations under subsections (a) and (b) above. Unless otherwise agreed under subsecUon 8.4, the Commitment shall conform with the title 
insurance Commitment provided under Section 7. 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than 7 calendar days after Acceptance. Seller will deliver to Buyer the following Seller Disclosures: (a) 
a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and doted by Seller, (b) a Commitment for the policy of title insurance required under Section 
6, to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller, including copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment; (c) a copy 
of all loon documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber the Property after Closing; and (d) a copy of all leases affecting the Property 
not expiring prior to Closing Seller agrees to pay any title Commitment cancellation charge under subsection (b). 
8. GENERAL CONTINGENCIES. In addition to Qualification under Section 2.2 this offer is: (a) subject to Buyer's approval of the content of each 
of the items referenced in Section 7 above; and (b) Q Is 2?is not subject to Buyer's approval of an inspection of the Property. The inspection shall be 
paid for by Buyer and shall he conducted by on individual/company of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to fully cooperate with such inspection and a walk-
through inspection under Section 11 and to make the Property available for the same. 
8.1 Buyer shall hove tjfo calendar days after Acceptance in which to review the content of Seller Disclosures, and, if the inspection contingency 
applies, to complete and evaluate the inspection of the Property, and to determine, if, In Buyer's sole discretion, the content of all Seller Disclosures 
(including the Property Inspection) is acceptable. 
8.2 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure or the Property Inspection within the time provided in 
subsection 8.1 above, that document or inspection will be deemed approved or waived by Buyer. 
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shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's ob> ». If Buyer s objections are not resolved witmn uic a w w«.v ~r \ 
by providing written notice to Seller within the same seven calendar days. The Brokerage, upon a receipt of a copy off •. y ' written "^ f^?^*™ R 1 " " 1 
to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization from Seller. If this contract is not voided by Buyer, 
Buyer's objection is deemed to have been waived. However, this waiver does not affect those items warranted in Section i 1. 
8.4 Resolution of Buyers objections under Section 8.3 shall be in writing and shall be specifically enforceable as covenants of Uiis Contract. 
9. SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to: 
The terms of attached Addendum * i are incorporated into this Contract by this reference. 
10. SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the condition of the Property are limited to the following: 
10.1 When Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings; 
10.2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixtures, heating, cooling, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler 
systems, appliances and fireplaces in working order, 
10.3 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller, 
10.4 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Property in working order and in 
compliance with governmental regulations; 
10.5 Seller will be responsible for repairing any of Seller's moving-related damage to the Property; 
10.6 At Closing, Seller will bring current all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer and will discharge 
all such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed; and 
10.7 As of Cloning, Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the Property 
which has not been resolved. 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. Before Closing, Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the 
Property to determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1,10.2,10.3 and 10.4 are in the warranted condition and to verify items 
included in Section 1.1 are presently on the Property. If any item is not in the warranted condition. Seller will correct, repair or replace it as necessary 
or, with the consent of Buyer, escrow an amount at Closing to provide for such repair or replacement. The Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" 
inspection, or to claim during the "walk-through" inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced in Section 1.1, or is not in the condition 
warranted in Section 10. shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of Buyer's rights under Section i. 1 or of the warranties contained in Section 10. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be-made, no new leases entered into, and no 
substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of Buyer. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate or other entity, the person executing this Contract 
on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitute the entire Contract 
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and ail prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. 
This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the 
Earnest Money Deposit, the breach or termination of this Contract, or the services relating to this transaction, shall first be submitted to mediation in 
accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Disputes shall include representations made 
by the parties, any Broker or other person or entity in connection with the sale, purchase, financing, condition or other aspect of the Property to which 
this Contract penains. including without limitation, allegations of concealment, misrepresentation, negligence and/or fraud. Each pany agrees to bear 
its own costs of mediation. Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to toe mediation shall be binding. If mediation fails, the procedures applicable 
and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this SeeiMnv Sshall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending 
mediation. By marking this box J^, and adding their initials, the Buyer \Vvi\V and the Seller ( ), agree that mediation under this Section IS is nut 
mandatory, but is optional upon agreement of all parties. f^" 
16. DEFAULV. If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money 
Deposit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept 
from Seller as liquidated damages, a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit, or to sue Seller for specific performance end/or damages. If Buyer elects 
to accept the liquidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific 
remedy the parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common law. 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
18. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it is authorized by: (a) Section 2, Section 8.3 
or Section 15; (b) separate written agreement of the parties; or (c) court order. 
19. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damnge to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction. Extensions must be agreed to in writing 
by all parties. Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the 
stated date. 
22. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS. Facsimile transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile 
transmission, shall be the same as delivery of an original. If the transaction involves multiple Buyers or Sellers, facsimile transmissions may be 
executed in counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other; (a) signs the offer or counter 
wliere noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as 
required. 
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If Seller does not accept 
this offer by 5 D AM 5tPM Mountain Time \ \ \ * l 19*i4 . this offer shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money 
Depositjp/Buyer. 
)fler date) (O f D (Buyer's Signature) (Offer Dale) 
The above date shall be the Offer Reference Date. 
(Notice Address) (Phone) (Notice Address) (Phone) 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/CQUNTER OFFER 
CHECK ONE*. 
D Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
(Sellers Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Notice Address) (Notice Address) 
D Rejections Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. (Seller's initials) Pate) (Time) 
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